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IN THE SUPREME COURT 






County, a corporate bo<ly ; 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10397 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This was an action brought by a tavern owner in 
Salt Lake County to l'ompel the County Licensing 
Diredor to issue to it a Class B beer license and a liquor 
<·ons11mplion license Tlw licenses had been refused 
011 the h;tsis I Jia t applil'ahle zoning did not allmv that 
~.\'llf' of h11sinesc. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LO,¥ER COURT 
The case was heard upon stipulated facts, wherein 
it was further stipulated that the only issue to be de-
termined was whether Salt Lake County should be 
estopped, by reason of its past failure to enforce the 
zoning ordinance with respect to plaintiff's premises, 
and plaintiff's reliance thereon, from refusing to re-
license plaintiff's tavern, on the basis of improper zon-
ing. Upon reciprocal motions for summary judgment, 
the case was heard by the Honorable Stewart M. Han-
son, who found that defendant was so estopped and 
entered judgment for plaintiff, ordering that defendant 
forthwith issue to plaintiff a cabaret license, a class B 
beer license and liquor consumption license, and that 
"such licenses shall continue to be issued for so long 
as plaintiff remains in possession of said premises under 
its present lease." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, defendant seeks to reverse the 
judgment of the lower court in its entirety and to obtain 
a dismissal of the action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts upon which this case was decided are 
fully set forth in the stipulation of facts appearing 
in the record and will only be briefly restated here. 
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Since 1058, premises located at 7263 So. State 
Street aud pop11larly known as the Black Hand Tav-
ern have been licenseJ by defendant to serve bottled 
and draft beer (Class B License). On January 21, 
l9fi3, plaintiff leased the premises as a tavern or cabaret, 
although from July l, 1963 to June 30, 1964 the 
licenses were in the name of Reba J. Clerico, who 
managed the premises for plaintiff. 
On or about October 1, 19G3, defendant notified 
plaintiff that subsequeni licenses would not be issued 
because the premises were located in a Commercial 
C-2 zone, which does not allow establishments where 
beer is consumed on the premises. Such premises had 
been so zoned prior to the time that plaintiff leased 
the premises. It is undisputed that, in view of the ap-
plicable zoning, defendant had erroneously issued li-
censes to plaintiff prior to June 30, 1964. 
It was stipulatetl that plaintiff has made sub-
stantial improvements to said premises and is obligated 
on the lease through November, 1967, for the sum of 
$225.00 per month. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One: Defendant, by its past conduct in fail-
ing to enforce the zoning ordinances in connection with 
pluintzff"s premises. is not cs topped from refusing the 
plaintiff a lfr('nse to operate the premises, as in the 
pas( in violation of the zoniny ordinances, and the lower 
court erred in requiring defendant to issue such licenses 
to plaintiff. 
Defendant submits that this case is controlled by a 
recent decision of this Court in Morrison v. Horne, 
12 Utah 2d 131, 363 P 2d 1113 (1961). 
In that case, the plaintiff had been refused a permit 
to erect a service station upon property in Salt Lake 
County. The property in question had been located 
in a residential zone since 1953, although a small gro-
cery store had stood on the property and the County 
Assessor had, for a number of years after 1953, erro-
neously listed and assessed the property as commercial. 
The plaintiff had purchased the property in 1960 shortly 
before the store, which had been vacant since about 
1955, burned down. 
On appeal from a mandate requiring the county 
zoning authorities to issue a building permit for con-
struction of the service station, this Court reversed, 
holding that the county was not estopped to assert the 
residential zoning requirement because the assessor 
had erroneously listed the property as commercial. 
In doing so, the court said (p. 1114): 
"As to estoppel: It would be unreasonable and 
unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a minis-
terial officer having no authority to do so, could 
bind the county to a variation of a zoning ordi-
nance duly passed, to which everyone has notice 
by its passage and publication, because a minis-
terial employee erred in characterizing the type 
of property. The authorities generally support 
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such a conclusion, and we are constrained to 
and do hold that the assessor's erroneous descrip-
tion of the subject property as commercial does 
not preclude the zoning authorities from deny-
ing the permit for the service station." 
A case strikingly similar to the instant case was 
Fass v. City of Highland Park, 326 Mich. 19, 39 N.W. 
2d 336 ( 1949). In that case, plaintiffs for several years 
had been given a permit to sell live poultry. Subse-
quently, when plaintiffs applied for a renewal of the 
permit, it was refused on the basis that the zoning, 
which had existed for a number of years, would not 
allow the sale of live poultry. Plaintiffs contended that 
the defendant city, by its past conduct, was estopped 
from enforcing the zoning ordinance. As additional 
ground for estoppel, the plaintiffs alleged that they 
had purchased the property in reliance on statements 
made by the city engineer that there would be no ob-
jections to the killing and sale of live poultry on the 
premises. They further alleged that they had thereafter 
expended the sum of $18,000 to construct and equip 
the builcling. 
In denying the plaintiffs' contention, the court 
stated (p. 341): 
"Plaintiffs' claim that the defendant mumc1-
pality is estopped to enforce its zoning ordi-
11anee against plaintiffs' property because of the 
improper issuance of the building permit and 
of the licenses for the years 1945, 1946, and 
l \H'7, is not tenable. At the time such acts were 
performed plaintiffs were charged with knowl-
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edge of the restrictive pr.ovisi?.ns ~! t~e ~rdinance 
as applied to property m a B2 district. Such 
acts being unauthorized and in express contra-
vention of ordinance provisions of the city, plain-
tiffs acquired no vested right to use their prop-
erty for a purpose forbidden by law. No claim 
is made that the building erected by plaintiffs, 
or the equipment therein, cannot be utilized for 
the transaction of a permissible business." 
There are numerous decisions supporting the two 
cited cases. It would accomplish little to repeat them 
here, since many such cases can be found annotated in 
Metzenbaum, Law on Zoning, Second Edition, Chapter 
V-t, page 162 et. seg. and 1 A.L.R. 2d 338, both of 
which works were cited with approval by this Court in 
the Morrison case. 
It is true that there have been some decisions where 
estoppel has been successfully asserted in zoning cases. 
However, these have been exceptional cases and are 
in the distinct minority. A review of these cases will 
disclose that most of them dealt with situations where 
the official of the governmental agency (whose actions 
were alleged to be the basis of the estoppel) acted within 
his authority; albeit, perhaps erroneously. See, e. g., 
City of Dallas v. Rosenthal, 239 S. W. 2d 636 (Texas 
Civ. App., 1951) ; Crow v. Board of Adjustment, 227 
Iowa 324, 288 N. W. 145. In some cases the restrictive 
ordinances or regulations had been passed after the 
acts claimed to have constituted the estoppel occurred. 
See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44 
So.2d 808 (Florida, 1950) . 
8 
Neither of the above is the situation here. The 
county officials who had failed to enforce the zoning 
ordinance with respect to plaintiff's property had, of 
course, no authority to do so. Moreover, plaintiff took 
the property and entered into the lease charged with 
knowledge that the intended use was in violation of the 
zoning laws . Thus, it is difficult to see how it can be 
heard to say that it acted in reasonable reliance upon the 
acts of the defendant's officials. 
Plaintiff implies that because it has expended sub-
stantial sums to improve the property and is obligated 
on the lease, it will be seriously damaged if it cannot 
operate the premises as a tavern. There is, howe,'er, 
no cJaim or evidence that a business allowed by the 
zoning ordinance cannot be profitably operated on the 
premises. 
Defendant submits that under the law of this state 
and the vast majority of other jurisdictions, Salt Lake 
County cannot be estopped by acts of its officers beyond 
their authority, and should not be estopped in this case. 
Point Two: Even if defendant should be estopped 
from refusing plaintiff the license requested, the order 
of the court was too broad in requiring that the licenses 
shall continue to be issued for so long as plaintiff re-
mains in possession of subject premises under its present 
lease. 
The judgment entered by the lower court did not 
rne1 ely prevent defendant from refusing licensing on 
the basis of improper zoning, but required it to issue 
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such licenses for so long as plaintiff remains m pos-
session under its present lease. Obviously this is too 
broad, even assuming that plaintiff should prevail in 
its main contention. 
There are a number of reasons why a beer license 
might be refused or terminated. The order, as it now 
stands, would ostensibly prohibit defendant from refus-
ing or terminating the plaintiff's license should it become 
a nuisance or repeatedly violate other laws regarding 
the sale of beer or consumption of liquor. 
Even though it should be found that defendant is 
estopped to raise the issue of plaintiff's violations of 
the zoning ordinance, the order should be amended to 
allow refusal of licensing in the event other grounds 
therefor occur. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RALPH L. JERMAN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Civil Division 
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